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Chapter 2
Semiotics in Theory and Practice
in Mathematics Education
2.1 A Summary of Influential Semiotic Theories
and Applications
Both Peirce and de Saussure developed theories dealing with signs and signiﬁca-
tion. Because these differ in a signiﬁcant aspect—a three-fold relation in the case of
the former, a two-fold relation in the case of the latter—Peirce’s version goes under
semiotics, whereas de Saussure’s version often is referred to as semiology.
2.1.1 Saussure
The basic ideas of this semiotic theory are as follows. Ferdinand de Saussure’s
(1959) semiology was developed in the context of his structural theory of general
linguistics. In this theory, a linguistic sign is the result of coupling two elements, a
concept and an acoustic image. To anticipate ambiguities de Saussure proposed to
understand the sign as the relation of a signiﬁed and a signiﬁer, in a close, insep-
arable relationship (metaphorically, like the two sides of a single piece of paper, as
he suggests). He uses two now classical diagrams to exemplify the sign. In the ﬁrst,
the Latin word arbor [tree] (on the bottom) and the French «arbre» [tree] (on top)
form a sign, where the former is the signiﬁer and the latter the signiﬁed. In the
second diagram, arbor is retained as the signiﬁer but the drawing of a tree takes the
place of the signiﬁed. It is noteworthy that both components in this dyad are
psychological1: the acoustic image is a psychological pattern of a sound, which
could be a word, a phrase, or even an intonation. These signiﬁers are arbitrary, in
1De Saussure uses the French psychique [psychical] rather than mental, just as Vygotsky will use
psixičeskij [psychical] rather than duxovnyj [mental]. In both instances, the adjective psychological
is the better choice because it allows for bodily knowing that is not mental in kind (e.g., Roth
2016b).
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the sense that there is no logical necessity underlying them—which accounts for
humanity’s many languages—but they are not the product of whim because they
are socially determined.
This theory has applications in mathematics education. Saussure’s ideas were
brought to the attention of the mathematics education community in the 1990s in a
keynote presentation by Whitson (1994), and by Kirshner and Whitson in the
context of a book on situated cognition, in a chapter titled “Cognition as a semiosic
process: From situated mediation to critical reflective transcendence” (Whitson
1997). Whitson pointed out that for Saussure, although there was interplay between
the signiﬁed and signiﬁer (denoted by arrows in both directions in his diagrams),
the signiﬁed, as the top element of the dyad, appeared to dominate the signiﬁer.
Lacan (1966) had inverted this relationship, placing the signiﬁer on top of the
signiﬁed, creating a chain of signiﬁers that never really attain the signiﬁed. This
version of semiology was used by Walkerdine (1988), and also became important in
Presmeg’s research in the 1990s using chains of signiﬁcation to connect cultural
practices of students, in a series of steps, with the canonical mathematical ideas
from the syllabuses used by teachers of classroom mathematics (Presmeg 1997).
The Lacanian version also is central to a recent conceptualization of subjectivity in
mathematics education, which emphasizes that “the signiﬁer does not mark a thing”
but “marks a point of pure difference or movement in a discursive chain” (Brown
2011, p. 112). This movement from signiﬁer to signiﬁer creates an effect similar to
the interpretant in Peircean semiotics, where one sign–referent relation replaces
another sign–referent relation leading to inﬁnite (unlimited) semiosis (Nöth 1990).
The theoretical ideas of de Saussure have not been used as extensively in
mathematics education research as those of Peirce, and of Vygotsky (in his earlier
notion of semiotic mediation), but there are aspects of Saussure’s theory that are
highly signiﬁcant. As Fried (2007, 2008) points out, de Saussure’s notions of
synchronicity and diachronicity are particularly useful in clarifying ways of looking
at both the history of mathematics, and the processes involved in teaching and
learning mathematics. The synchronic view is a snapshot in time, while a dia-
chronic analysis is a longitudinal one. A useful botanical metaphor is that syn-
chrony refers to a cross-section of a plant stem, while diachrony takes a longitudinal
section. These views are complementary, and both are necessary for a full under-
standing of a phenomenon (Fried 2007). In mathematics education we are interested
not only in understanding what is taught and learned in a given situation (syn-
chrony), but particularly in how ideas change—in the processes involved as stu-
dents engage over time with mathematical objects (diachrony). In both the
synchronic and diachronic views, sign vehicles play a signiﬁcant role in standing
for mathematical objects; hence both of these distinct viewpoints are useful in
semiotic analyses.
The dyadic model of Saussure proved inadequate to account for the results of
Presmeg’s research, and was later replaced by a Peircean nested model that invoked
the interpretant (Presmeg 1998, 2006b).
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2.1.2 Peirce
The basic ideas of this theory are as follows. According to Peirce (1992), tri-
chotomic is the art of making three-fold divisions. By his own admission, he
showed a proclivity for the number three in his philosophical thinking. “But it will
be asked, why stop at three?” he wrote (Peirce 1992, p. 251), and his reply to the
question is as follows:
[W]hile it is impossible to form a genuine three by any modiﬁcation of the pair, without
introducing something of a different nature from the unit and the pair, four, ﬁve, and every
higher number can be formed by mere complications of threes. (p. 251)
Accordingly, he used triads not only in his semiotic model including object,
representamen [sign vehicle], which stands for the object in some way, and in-
terpretant, but also in the types of each of these components. These types are not
inherent in the signs themselves, but depend on the interpretations of their con-
stituent relationships between sign vehicles and objects. In a letter to Lady Welby
on December 23, 1908, he wrote as follows.
I deﬁne a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and
so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is
thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop to
Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood. I recognize
three Universes, which are distinguished by three Modalities of Being. (Peirce 1998,
p. 478)
It follows that different individuals may construct different interpretants from the
same sign vehicle, thus effectively creating different signs for the same object.
Peirce developed several typologies of signs. Maybe the best known typology is
the one based on the kind of relationship between a sign vehicle and its object. The
relationship leads to three kinds of signs: iconic, indexical, and symbolic. To
illustrate the differences among iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs, it may be
useful to look at some of Peirce’s examples. In an iconic sign, the sign vehicle and
the object share a physical resemblance, e.g., a photograph of a person representing
the actual person. Signs are indexical if there is some physical connection between
sign vehicle and object, e.g., smoke invoking the interpretation that there is ﬁre, or a
sign-post pointing to a road. The nature of symbolic signs is that there is an element
of convention in relating a particular sign vehicle to its object (e.g., algebraic
symbolism). These distinctions in mathematical signs are complicated by the fact
that three different people may categorize the ‘same’ relationship between a sign
vehicle and its object in such a way that it is iconic, indexical, or symbolic
respectively, according to their interpretations. In practice the distinctions are subtle
because they depend on the interpretations of the learner—and therefore, viewed in
this way, the distinctions may be useful to a researcher or teacher for the purpose of
identifying the subtlety of a learner’s mathematical conceptions if differences in
interpretation are taken into account.
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Peirce also introduced three conceptual categories that he termed ﬁrstness,
secondness, and thirdness. Firstness has to do with that which makes possible the
recognizance of something as it appears in the phenomenological realm. It has to do
with the qualia of the thing. We become aware of things because we are able to
recognize their own quale. A quale is the distinctive mark of something, regardless
of something else (it is its suchness). “Each quale is in itself what it is for itself,
without reference to any other” (Peirce CP 6.224). Thus, what allows us to perceive
a red rose is the quality of redness. Were we to be left without qualia, we would not
be able to perceive anything. However, quale is not perception yet. It is its mere
possibility: it is ﬁrstness—the ﬁrst category of being in Peirce’s account. “The
mode of being a redness, before anything in the universe was yet red, was never-
theless a positive qualitative possibility” (CP 1.25). Qualia—such as bitter, tedious,
hard, heartrending, noble (CP. 1.418)—account hence for the possibility of expe-
rience, making it possible to note that something is there, positioned, as it were, in
the boundaries of consciousness (Radford 2008a).
Now, the very eruption of the object into our ﬁeld of perception marks the
indexical moment of consciousness. It is a moment of actuality or occurrence. Here,
we enter secondness:
We ﬁnd secondness in occurrence, because an occurrence is something whose existence
consists in our knocking up against it. A hard fact is of the same sort; that is to say, it is
something which is there, and which I cannot think away, but am forced to acknowledge as
an object or second beside myself, the subject or number one, and which forms material for
the exercise of my will. (Peirce CP 1.358)
Because we have reached awareness, the object now becomes an object of
knowledge. But knowledge is not an array of isolated facts or events. Rather, it
results from a linkage between facts, and this link, Peirce argues, requires us to
enter into a level that goes beyond quality (ﬁrstness) and factuality (secondness).
This new level (thirdness) requires the use of symbols. Commenting on the sub-
tleties of the interrelationships amongst ﬁrstness, secondness, and thirdness as
either ontological or as phenomenological categories Sáens-Ludlow and Kadunz
(2016) mention the following:
Peirce’s semiotics is founded on his three connected categories, which can be differentiated
from each other, and which cannot be reduced to one another. Peirce argued that there are
three and only three categories: ‘He claims that he has look[ed] long and hard to disprove
his doctrine of three categories but that he has never found anything to contradict it, and he
extends to everyone the invitation to do the same’ (de Waal 2013, p. 44). The existence of
these three categories has been called Peirce’s theorem.… He considers these categories to
be both ontological and phenomenological; the former deals with the nature of being and
the latter with the phenomenon of conscious experience. (Sáenz-Ludlow and Kadunz 2016,
p. 4)
Peirce’s model includes the need for expression or communication: “Expression
is a kind of representation or signiﬁcation. A sign is a third mediating between the
mind addressed and the object represented” (Peirce 1992, p. 281). In an act of
communication, then—as in teaching—there are three kinds of interpretant, as
follows:
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• the “Intensional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the
utterer”;
• the “Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the inter-
preter”; and
• the “Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which is a
determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have
to be fused in order that any communication should take place.” (Peirce 1998,
p. 478, his emphasis)
It is the latter fused mind that Peirce designated the commens. The commens
proved to be an illuminating lens in examining the history of geometry (Presmeg
2003).
The complexity and subtlety of Peirce’s notions result in opportunities for their
use in a wide variety of research studies in mathematics education.
Applications in mathematics education are as follows.
As an example, let us examine the quadratic formula in terms of the triad of iconic,
indexical, and symbolic sign vehicles. The roots of the equation ax2þ bxþ c ¼ 0







Because symbols are used, the interpreted relationship of this inscription with its
mathematical object may be characterized as symbolic, involving convention.
However, depending on the way the inscription is interpreted, the sign could also be
characterized as iconic or indexical. The formula involves spatial shape. In
Presmeg’s (1985) original research study of visualization in high school mathe-
matics, many of the 54 students interviewed reported spontaneously that they
remembered this formula by an image of its shape, an iconic property. However, the
formula is also commonly interpreted as a pointer (cf. a direction sign on a road): it is
a directive to perform the action of substituting values for the variables a, b, and c in
order to solve the equation. In this sense the formula is indexical. Thus whether the
sign vehicle of the formula is classiﬁed as iconic, indexical, or symbolic depends on
the interpretant of the sign. The phenomenological classiﬁcation is of importance.
The Peircean approach also was central to a study of how professionals, sci-
entists and technicians, read graphs (Roth and Bowen 2001). In that study, certain
aspects of graphs (e.g., the value of a function or its slope at a certain value of the
abscissa) were taken as a sign that referred to some biological phenomenon, such as
changes in population size. Importantly, the study pointed out that the signs did not
just exist. Instead, these needed to emerge from the interpretive activity before they
could be related to a biological phenomenon. The results may be understood in
terms of the deﬁnition of the sign as relation between two segmentations of the
material continuum (Eco 1986). As a study of the transformations within a scientiﬁc
research group shows, not the material matters to signiﬁcation but the form of this
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material (Latour 1993). In the case of familiar signs that appear in familiar cir-
cumstances, interpretation is not observed; instead, in reading, users see right
through the sign as if it were transparent thereby giving access to the phenomenon
itself (Roth 2003a; Roth and Bowen 2003; Roth et al. 2002).
2.1.3 Vygotsky
Basic ideas
Vygotsky’s writings spanned a short period of time (from 1915 to 1934). During
this period, Vygotsky tackled different problems (creative thinking, special edu-
cation, cognitive functions, cultural child development, emotions, etc.) from dif-
ferent angles. Contemporary Vygotskian scholars suggest a rough division of
Vygotsky’s work in terms of domains and moments. Taking a critical stance
towards the current chronology of Vygotsky’s works, in his article “The Vygotsky
that we (do not) know,” Yasnitsky (2011) identiﬁes three main interrelated domains
of research that occupied the “Vygotsky circle” (the circle of Vygotsky and his
collaborators):
(a) clinical and special education studies;
(b) philological studies (covering problems of language, thinking, and culture);
and
(c) studies around affect, will, and action.
González Rey (2011a) suggests an approach to the understanding of Vygotsky’s
work in terms of three moments, each one marking different emphases that cannot
be attributed to a premeditated clear intention:
Differing emphases that characterize moments in Vygotsky’s work did not come about
purely as a result of clear intentions. Those moments were also influenced by the effects of
the turbulent epoch during which his writings were brought to life, during which the world
saw the succession of the Russian Revolution, the First World War, and the rise of Stalin to
the top of Soviet political leadership. (González Rey 2011b, p. 258)
The ﬁrst moment covers approximately from 1915 to 1928. Vygotsky’s focus
here is on the active character of the mind, emotions and phantasy. The main work
of Vygotsky’s ﬁrst moment is his 1925 book The psychology of art (Vygotsky
1971).
The central subject of the book suggests a psychology oriented to essential human ques-
tions, irreducible to behavior or to an objectivistic view of human beings … in Psychology
of Art, the basis was created for a psychology capable of studying the human person in all
her complexity, as an individual whose psychical processes have a cultural-historical
genesis. (González Rey 2011b, p. 259)
The second moment goes roughly from 1927 to 1931. It is in the second moment
that we ﬁnd Vygotsky elaborating his concept of sign. Vygotsky’s concept of sign
was influenced by his work on special education (Vygotsky 1993). In a paper from
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1929 he stated that “From a pedagogical point of view, a blind or deaf child may, in
principle, be equated with a normal child, but the deaf or blind child achieves the
goals of a normal child by different means and by a different path” (p. 60). The
special child may achieve her goal in interaction with other individuals. “Left to
himself [sic] and to his own natural development, a deaf-mute child will never learn
speech, and a blind person will never master writing. In this case education comes
to the rescue” (p. 168). And how does education do it? Vygotsky’s answer is: by
“creating artiﬁcial, cultural techniques, that is, a special system of cultural signs and
symbols” (p. 168). In other words, auxiliary material cultural means (e.g., Braille
dots) compensate for differences in the child’s sensorial organization. Vygotsky
thought of these compensating means as signs.
As a result, in Vygotsky’s account, signs are not characterized by their repre-
sentational nature. Signs are rather characterized by their functional role: as external
or material means of regulation and self-control. Signs serve to fulﬁll psychological
operations (Radford and Sabena 2015). Thus, in a paper read at the Institute of
Scientiﬁc Pedagogy at Moscow State University on April 28, 1928, Vygotsky
(1993) argued that “A child learns to use certain signs functionally as a means to
fulﬁlling some psychological operation or other. Thus, elementary and primitive
forms of behavior become mediated cultural acts and processes” (p. 296). It is from
here that Vygotsky developed the idea of the sign both as a psychological tool and
as a cultural mediator.
This two-fold idea of signs allowed him to account for the nature of what he
termed the higher psychological functions (which include memory and perception)
and to tackle the question of child development from a cultural viewpoint. “The
inclusion in any process of a sign,” he noted, “remodels the whole structure of
psychological operations just as the inclusion of a tool remodels the whole structure
of a labor operation” (Vygotsky 1929, p. 421). Signs, hence, are not merely aids to
carry out a task or to solve a problem. By becoming included in the children’s
activities, they alter the way children come to know about the world and about
themselves. However, the manner in which signs alter the human mind is not
related to signs qua signs. The transformation of the human mind that signs
effectuate is related to their social-cultural-historical role. That is, it depends on how
signs signify and are used collectively in society. This is the idea behind Vygotsky’s
famous genetic law of cultural development, which he presented as follows: “Every
[psychic] function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: ﬁrst, on the
social level, and later, on the individual level” (Vygotsky 1978, p. 57).
Commenting on this idea, Vygotsky (1997) offered the example of language:
When we studied the processes of the higher functions in children we came to the following
staggering conclusion: each higher form of behavior enters the scene twice in its devel-
opment—ﬁrst as a collective form of behavior, as an inter-psychological function, then as
an intra-psychological function, as a certain way of behaving. We do not notice this fact,
because it is too commonplace and we are therefore blind to it. The most striking example
is speech. Speech is at ﬁrst a means of contact between the child and the surrounding
people, but when the child begins to speak to himself, this can be regarded as the trans-
ference of a collective form of behavior into the practice of personal behavior. (p. 95)
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To account for the process that leads from a collective form of behavior to an
intra-psychological function Vygotsky introduced the concept of internalization.
He wrote: “We call the internal reconstruction of an external operation internal-
ization” (Vygotsky 1978, p. 56). To illustrate the idea of internalization Vygotsky
(1978) provided the example of pointing gestures:
A good example of this process may be found in the development of pointing. Initially, this
gesture is nothing more than an unsuccessful attempt to grasp something, a movement
aimed at a certain object which designates forthcoming activity. The child attempts to grasp
an object placed beyond his reach; his hands, stretched toward that object, remain poised in
the air. His ﬁngers make grasping movements. At this initial stage pointing is represented
by the child’s movement, which seems to be pointing to an object—that and nothing more.
When the mother comes to the child’s aid and realizes his movement indicates something,
the situation changes fundamentally. Pointing becomes a gesture for others. The child’s
unsuccessful attempt engenders a reaction not from the object he seeks but from another
person. Consequently, the primary meaning of that unsuccessful grasping movement is
established by others. Only later, when the child can link his unsuccessful grasping
movement to the objective situation as a whole, does he begin to understand this movement
as pointing. (p. 56)
To sum up, in the second moment of Vygotsky’ work there is a shift from
imagination, phantasy, emotions, personality, and problems of personal experience
to an instrumental investigation of higher psychological functions. This instru-
mental investigation revolved around the notion of signs as a tool and the con-
comitant idea of semiotic mediation.
González Rey (2009) qualiﬁes this moment as an instrumentalist “objectivist
turn,” that is, a turn in which the subjective dimension that was at the heart of
Vygotsky’s ﬁrst moment shades away to yield room to the study of “internalization
of prior external processes and operations” (p. 63). He continues:
Vygotsky explained the transition from intermental to intra-mental, a speciﬁcally psychical
ﬁeld, through internalization, which still represents a very objectivistic approach to the
comprehension of the psyche. This comprehension of that process does not lend a gener-
ative character to the mind as a system, recognizing it only as an internal expression of a
formerly inter-mental process. Several Soviet psychologists also criticized the concept of
internalization in different periods. (p. 64)
In the third moment (roughly located during the period from 1932 to 1934),
Vygotsky returned with new vigor to some ideas of the ﬁrst moment, such as the
unity between cognition and emotion, and the interrelationship of social context and
subjective experience. During those years, he pointed out that the genetic origin of
all higher psychological functions was a soci(et)al relation (Vygotsky 1989). He did
not write that there was something in the relation that then was transferred mys-
teriously into the person. Instead, the soci(et)al relation itself is the higher function.
That is, the developing individual already contributes to the realization of the higher
function; it is when s/he assumes all parts of the relation that the higher function can
be ascribed to the individual (e.g., Roth 2016b). Moving away from the mechanist
or instrumental turn of the second period, questions of the generative power of the
mind that we ﬁnd in his study of Hamlet came to the fore again (Vygotsky 1971).
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Although the aforementioned moments are relevant in the understanding of
Vygotsky’s ideas and in particular the understanding of Vygotsky’s semiotics, we
should not think that the problems that Vygotsky tackled were marked differently
from one moment to the other. These moments may be understood in terms of
focus. We should not think for instance that, in the second period, signs are strictly
thought of as mediators per se; they were associated with meaning too. Already in
his work on special education Vygotsky (1993) noted that “Meaning is what is
important, not the signs in themselves. We may change the signs but the meaning
will be preserved” (p. 85). The problem of meaning is tackled again in his later
work, this time in the context of a communicative ﬁeld that is common to the
participants in a relation (Roth 2016a). In some notes from an internal seminar in
1933—hence a short time before Vygotsky’ death—a seminar in which Vygotsky
(1997) summarized his group’s accomplishments and new research avenues, we
read: “the problem of meaning was already present in [our] older investigations.
Whereas before our task was to demonstrate what ‘the knot’ and logical memory
have in common, now our task is to demonstrate the difference that exists between
them” (pp. 130–131).
Some Russian scholars in the cultural-historical tradition now suggest that
towards the very end of his life, Vygotsky was moving away from the idea of sign
mediation, developing instead the idea of a semiotic or intersubjective speech ﬁeld
(e.g., El’konin 1994; Mikhailov 2006). One indication of this move is noticeable at
the very end of the posthumously published Thinking and speech (Vygotsky 1987),
where he notes that the word is impossible for an individual, but is a reality for two.
Even if a person writes into a diary, s/he still is relating to herself as to another.
Thus, signs generally and language speciﬁcally—generally theorized as the medi-
ators between subject and material world or between two subjects—“are given to
the child not as an ensemble of mediators between the child and nature, but, in fact,
as subjectively his own; for all of these things are subjectively ‘everyone’s’”
(Mikhailov 2001, p. 27, original emphasis, underline added). This insight implies
that intersubjectivity is not problematic, as often assumed; it is a modality of the
semiotic speech ﬁeld. Instead, subjectivity is the result of participation in relations
with others, relations that take place in a semiotic ﬁeld. The very notion of a
mediator is the result of, or gives rise to, the Cartesian division between body and
mind or psychic-physical parallelism (Mikhailov 2004). To overcome the dangers
of the split between body and mind, Vygotsky was turning to a Spinozist idea,
where material bodies and culture (mind) are but two (contradictory) manifestations
of one substance. Based on the idea of inner contradictions, Marxist psychologists
have shown a possible evolutionary and cultural-historical trajectory that led from
the ﬁrst cell to the human psyche of today, including its languages and tools
(Holzkamp 1983; Leontyev 1981).
Applications to mathematics education
Vygotsky’s work has inspired mathematics education researchers interested in the
question of teaching and learning. Arzarello and his collaborators have been
interested in the evolution of signs. To do so, they have developed the theoretical
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construct of semiotic bundle (Arzarello 2006; Arzarello et al. 2009). This notion
encompasses signs and semiotic systems such as the contemporary mathematics
sign systems of algebra, Cartesian graphs, but also gestures, writing, speaking, and
drawing systems. Arzarello et al.’s work is located within a broader context of
multimodality that they explain as coming from neuroscience studies that have
highlighted the role of the brain’s sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge,
and also from communication and multiple modes to communicate and to express
meanings. Within this perspective, a semiotic bundle is deﬁned as
a system of signs […] that is produced by one or more interacting subjects and that evolves
in time. Typically, a semiotic bundle is made of the signs that are produced by a student or
by a group of students while solving a problem and/or discussing a mathematical question.
Possibly the teacher too participates to this production and so the semiotic bundle may
include also the signs produced by the teacher. (Arzarello et al. 2009, p. 100)
Paying attention to a wide variety of means of expression, from the standard
algebraic or other mathematical symbols to the embodied ones, like gestures and
gazes, and considering them as semiotic resources in teaching and learning pro-
cesses, the concept of semiotic bundle goes beyond the range of semiotic resources
that are traditionally discussed in mathematics education literature (e.g., Duval
2006; Ernest 2006). Arzarello and collaborators track the students’ learning through
the evolution of signs in semiotic bundles.
Bartolini Bussi and Mariotti (2008) have focused on the concept of semiotic
mediation, in particular in the case of artifacts and signs. In their seminal paper they
distinguished between mediation and semiotic mediation. Mediation involves four
terms—someone who mediates (the mediator); something that is mediated; some-
one or something subjected to the mediation (the mediatee), and the circumstances
for mediation (Hasan 2002). Semiotic mediation, in Bartolini Bussi and Mariotti’s
(2008) account, appears as a particular case of mediation:
Within the social use of artifacts in the accomplishment of a task (that involves both the
mediator and the mediatees) shared signs are generated. On the one hand, these signs are
related to the accomplishment of the task, in particular related to the artifact used, and, on
the other hand, they may be related to the content that is to be mediated … Hence, the link
between artifacts and signs overcomes the pure analogy in their functioning in mediating
human action. It rests on the truly recognizable relationship between particular artifacts and
particular signs (or system of signs) directly originated by them. (p. 752)
Within this context, “any artifact will be referred to as tool of semiotic mediation
as long as it is (or it is conceived to be) intentionally used by the teacher to mediate
a mathematical content through a designed didactical intervention” (p. 754).
Anna Sfard (2008) has also drawn on Vygotsky in her research on thinking,
which she conceives of as the individualized form of interpersonal communication.
She wrote as follows:
Human communication is special, and not just because of its being mainly linguistic—the
feature that, in animals, seems to be extremely rare, if not lacking altogether. It is the role
communication plays in human life that seems unique. The ability to coordinate our
activities by means of interpersonal communication is the basis for our being social
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creatures. And because communication is the glue that holds human collectives together,
even our ability to stay alive is a function of our communicational capacity. We commu-
nicate in order to coordinate our actions and ascertain the kind of mutuality that provides us
with what we need and cannot attain single-handedly. (p. 81)
From this viewpoint, she deﬁnes thinking as follows: “Thinking is an individ-
ualized version of (interpersonal) communicating” (p. 81), that is, “as one’s com-
munication with oneself” (Sfard 2001, p. 26). An important role is ascribed to
communication mediators, which are “perceptually accessible objects with the help
of which the actor performs her prompting action and the re-actor is being
prompted” (Sfard 2008, p. 90). They include “artifacts produced specially for the
sake of communication (p. 90). Within this context, Sfard conceptualizes learning
as changes in discourse. More precisely,
learning mathematics means changing forms of communication. The change may occur in
any of the characteristics with the help of which one can tell one discourse from another:
words and their use, visual mediators and the ways they are operated upon, routine ways of
doing things, and the narratives that are being constructed and labelled as “true” or “cor-
rect.” (Sfard 2010, p. 217)
In the next section we turn to semiotics in mathematics education.
2.2 Further Applications of Semiotics in Mathematics
Education
The summary of influential semiotic theories conducted in the previous section
provided an idea of the impact of these theories in mathematics education. In this
section we discuss in more detail the impact that semiotics has had in speciﬁc
problems of mathematics teaching and learning.
As previously mentioned, two different approaches can be distinguished within
semiotics, depending on how signs are conceptualized: a representational one, in
which signs are essentially representation devices, and one in which signs are
conceptualized as mediating tools (Radford 2014b). There is still a third approach—
a dialectical materialist one—in which signs and artefacts are a fundamental part of
mathematical activity, yet they do not represent knowledge, nor do they mediate it
(Radford 2012). This is the approach to signs, artifacts, and material culture in
general that is featured in the theory of objectiﬁcation (Radford 2006b, 2008b,
2013b, 2015a, b). Such a conception of signs and artefacts is consubstantial with
the conception of the dialectical materialist idea of activity. This conception of
activity is very different from usual conceptions that reduce activity to a series of
actions that an individual performs in the attainment of his or her goal. The latter
line of thinking reduces activity to a functional conception: activity amounts to the
deeds and doings of the individuals. Activity in the theory of objectiﬁcation does
not merely mean to do something. Activity (Tätigkeit in German and deyatel’nost’
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in Russian) refers to a dynamic system geared to the satisfaction of collective needs
that rests on:
(1) speciﬁc forms of human collaboration; and
(2) deﬁnite forms of material and spiritual production.
Activity as Tätigkeit should not be confounded with activity as Aktivität/
aktivnost’, that is, as being simply busy with something (Roth and Radford 2011).
Activity as Tätigkeit does not have the utilitarian and selﬁsh stance that it has come
to have in capitalist societies. Activity as Tätigkeit is a social form of joint action
through which individuals produce their means of subsistence and “comprises
notions of self-expression, rational development, and aesthetic enjoyment”
(Donham 1999, p. 55). More precisely, it is a form of life. Activity as Tätigkeit is
the endless process through which individuals inscribe themselves in society.
To avoid confusions with other meanings, Activity as Tätigkeit is termed joint
labor in the theory of objectiﬁcation. The concept of joint labor allows one to revisit
classroom teaching and learning activity. It allows one to see teaching and learning
activity not as two separate activities, one carried out by the teacher (the teacher’s
activity) and another one carried out by the student (the student’s activity), but as a
single and same activity: the same teachers-and-students joint labor. The concept of
joint labor is central to the theory of objectiﬁcation: It is, indeed, through joint labor
that, in this theory, the students are conceived of as encountering and becoming
gradually aware of culturally and historically constituted forms of mathematics
thinking. The joint-labor bounded encounters with the historical forms of mathe-
matics thinking are termed processes of objectiﬁcation. The theory of objectiﬁca-
tion is an attempt to understand learning not as the result of the individual student’s
deeds (as in individualist accounts of learning) but as a cultural-historical situated
processes of knowing and becoming. It seeks to study the manners by which the
students become progressively aware of historically and culturally constituted
forms of thinking and acting, and how, as subjectivities in the making, teachers and
students position themselves in mathematical practices.
The semiotic dimension of the theory of objectiﬁcation is apparent at different
levels:
(1) The ﬁrst one is the level of the material culture (signs, artefacts, etc.).
(2) The second one is a suprastructural level of cultural meanings that shape and
organize joint labor.
As mentioned before, signs and artefacts are not considered representational
devices or aiding tools. But neither are they considered as the mere stuff that we
touch with our hands, hear with our ears, or perceive with our eyes. They are
considered as bearers of sedimented human labor. That is, they are bearers of
human intelligence and speciﬁc historical forms of human production that affect, in
a deﬁnite way, the manner in which we come to know about the world.
Now, the fact that signs and artifacts are bearers of human intelligence does not
mean that such an intelligence is transparent for the student who resorts to them.
Leont’ev (1968) notes:
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If a catastrophe would happen to our planet so that only small children would survive, the
human race would not disappear, but the history of humanity would inevitably be inter-
rupted. The treasures of material culture would continue to exist, but there would be no one
who would reveal their use to the young generations. The machines would be idle, the
books would not be read, artistic productions would lose their aesthetic function. The
history should restart from the beginning. (p. 29)
To fulﬁl their function and to release the historical intelligence embedded in
them, signs and artefacts have to become an integral part of joint labor. In doing so,
they become a central part of the processes through which students encounter
culturally and historically constituted forms of thinking and acting. All the semiotic
resources that students mobilize in order to become aware of such historical forms
of thinking and action are termed semiotic means of objectiﬁcation (Radford 2002a,
2003).
The term objectiﬁcation has its ancestor in the word object, whose origin derives
from the Latin verb obiectare, meaning “to throw something in the way, to throw
before” (Charleton 1996, p. 550). The sufﬁx–tiﬁcation comes from the verb facere
meaning “to do” or “to make” (p. 311), so that in its etymology, objectiﬁcation
becomes related to those actions aimed at bringing or throwing something in front
of somebody or at making something an object of awareness or consciousness
(Radford 2003). Semiotic means of objectiﬁcation may include material mathe-
matical signs (e.g. alphanumeric formulas and sentences, graphs, etc.) objects,
gestures, perceptual activity, written language, speech, the corporeal position of the
students and the teacher, rhythm, and so on.
An example of research
In order to show the pragmatic implications of the theoretical ideas presented in the
forgoing, the following is one example, in more detail, of research studies in this
paradigm.
Radford (2010a) discusses an example of pattern generalization in which Grade 2
seven-to-eight-year-old students were invited to draw Terms 5 and 6 of the sequence
shown in Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.2 shows two paradigmatic answers provided by two students: Carlos
and James.
These answers suggest that the students were focusing on numerosity. Such a
strategy may prove difﬁcult to answer questions about remote terms, such as Terms
12 or 25, which was in fact the case in this classroom. The students worked by
themselves more than 30 min. When the teacher came to see the students, she
engaged them in an exploration of the patterns in which a spatial structure came to
the fore: to see the terms as made up of two rows (see Fig. 2.3).
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4
Fig. 2.1 The ﬁrst terms of a sequence that Grade 2 students investigated in an algebra lesson
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The teacher says, “We will just look at the squares that are on the bottom.” At
the same time, to visually emphasize the object of attention and intention, the
teacher makes three consecutive sliding gestures, each one going from the bottom
row of Term 1 to the bottom row of Term 4. Figure 2.3, left, shows the beginning of
the ﬁrst sliding gesture. The teacher continues: “Only the ones on the bottom. Not
the ones that are on the top. In Term 1 (she points with her two index ﬁngers to the
bottom row of Term 1; see Fig. 2.3, left). How many [squares] are there?” Pointing,
one of the students answers “one.” The teacher and the students continue rhyth-
mically exploring the bottom row of Terms 2, 3, and 4, and also, through gestures
and words, the non-perceptually accessible Terms 5, 6, 7, and 8. Then, they turn to
the top row.
This short excerpt illustrates some semiotic means of objectiﬁcation: gestures,
words, the mathematical ﬁgures, body position, perceptual activity, and rhythm.
They are at work in a crucial part of the students’ joint labor process: the process of
objectiﬁcation, that is, the progressive, sensuous, and material encountering and
making sense of a historically and culturally form of thinking mathematically.
The theory of objectiﬁcation is a dialectical materialist theory based on the idea of
Otherness or alterity. Learning is to encounter something that is not me. The theory
of objectiﬁcation posits the subject and the object as heterogeneous entities. In
encountering the cultural object, that is to say, an object of history and culture, it
Fig. 2.2 Left Carlos, counting aloud, points sequentially to the squares in the top row of Term 3.
Middle Carlos’s drawing of Term 5. Right James’s drawing of Term 5
Fig. 2.3 Left The teacher pointing to the bottom rows. Right Students and the teacher counting
together
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objects me. Etymologically speaking, it means that I feel it as something alien and,
in the poetic encounter of the object and myself, I come to cognize it, not only
cognitively but emotionally, sensuously, even if I do not agree with it. This
encounter of the object is what objectiﬁcation is about (and from whence the theory
takes its name).
In the example under consideration, within the teacher-students joint labor
occurs a process of objectiﬁcation in the course of which the students start noticing
a culturally and historically constituted theoretical way of seeing and gesturing—
seeing and gesturing algebraically. The students start discerning a new way of
perceiving out of which an algebraic numerical-spatial structure becomes apparent
and can be now applied to other terms of the sequence that are not in the students’
perceptual ﬁeld.
In this example, imagination is central in the entailed process of objectiﬁcation.
Imagining the non-perceptually accessible terms is a fully sensuous process out of
which an algebraic sense of the functional relations between the number of the
terms and the number of squares in their bottom and top rows starts to emerge.
However, as the example suggests, the semiotic means of objectiﬁcation do not
operate isolated from each other. On the contrary, they operate through a complex
coordination of various sensorial modalities and semiotic registers that the students
and teachers mobilize in a process of objectiﬁcation.
The segment of joint labor where such a complex coordination of sensorial
modalities and semiotic registers occur is called a semiotic node (Radford et al.
2003). In the previous example, when the students are counting along with the
teacher, the semiotic node is a segment of joint labor where signs and sensuous
modalities cooperate in order for the students to notice, grasp and become aware, or
conscious of, an algebraic structure in the terms of the sequence. The segment of
joint labor that constitutes the semiotic node includes signs on the activity sheet, the
teacher’s sequence of gestures, the words that the teacher and the students pro-
nounce simultaneously, the coordinated perception of the teacher and the students,
the corporeal position of the students and the teacher, and rhythm as an encom-
passing sign that links gestures, perception, speech, and symbols. The semiotic
node is in this case a collective phenomenon out of which the algebraic structure
appears in sensible, collective consciousness.
Semiotic bundles (Arzarello 2006) and semiotic nodes (Radford et al. 2003) are
two theoretical constructs that attend to different things. A semiotic bundle is made
of the signs produced by teachers and students in problem solving. A semiotic
bundle attends to the evolution of signs:
Looking at the evolution of the students’ signs, the teacher can gain clues with respect to
the students’ understanding: the multimodal aspects of the activity can therefore help her
decide whether or not to intervene in order to support the students. (Radford et al. in press)
A semiotic node is not made of signs. It is a segment of the teacher’s and
students’ joint labor where a complex coordination of sensorial modalities and
semiotic registers occurs in a process of knowledge objectiﬁcation. Thus, while
semiotic bundles focus on signs, semiotic nodes focus on joint labor (Activity as
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Tätigkeit). It is a segment of joint labor in which a progressive encounter with
mathematics occurs. The encounter is described in terms of noticing, grasping,
making sense, awareness, becoming conscious. This is why semiotic nodes focus
on attention, intention, and meaning making.
Within dialectical materialism philosophy, which informs the theory of objec-
tiﬁcation, consciousness is a central concept. Vygotsky dealt with the concept of
consciousness throughout his academic life, from the famous “Consciousness as a
problem in the psychology of behavior” 1925 paper (Vygotsky 1979) up to his last
works (e.g., Thinking and speech, Vygotsky 1987). If we remove the concept of
consciousness (and stop talking about noticing, becoming aware, etc.) the theory of
objectiﬁcation just collapses (as the theory of didactic situations (Brousseau 1997)
would do if you removed from there the concept of situation or if you remove the
idea of autonomous child from constructivism). The theory of objectiﬁcation would
simply collapse because it deﬁnes learning as processes of objectiﬁcation, and these
are a problem of consciousness. There are many theories of learning that do not
need to refer to consciousness.
Of course, in dialectical materialism, consciousness is not the metaphysical
construct of idealism—something buried in the depths of the human soul. From the
dialectical materialist perspective adopted in the theory of objectiﬁcation, con-
sciousness is a concrete theoretical construct. As Vygotsky (1979, p. 31) stated in
1925: “consciousness must be seen as a particular case of the social experience.”
The structure of consciousness “is the relation [of the individual] with the external
world” (Vygotsky 1997, p. 137). Leont’ev (2009) insisted on the idea that con-
sciousness cannot be understood without understanding the individual’s activity
(Tätigkeit):
Man’s (sic) consciousness… is not additive. It is not a flat surface, nor even a capacity that
can be ﬁlled with images and processes. Nor is it the connections of its separate elements. It
is the internal movement of its “formative elements” geared to the general movement of the
activity which effects the real life of the individual in society. Man’s activity is the sub-
stance of his consciousness. (p. 26).
From this perspective, consciousness is open to empirical investigation, for as
Voloshinov (1973, p.11) put it, “consciousness… is ﬁlled with signs. Consciousness
becomes consciousness only once it has been ﬁlled with… (semiotic) content,
consequently, only in the process of social interaction”. In other words, the fabric of
consciousness is semiotic.
Let us come back to the previous example, to a passage where the teacher and
the students are exploring the bottom row of the terms—a passage that occurred a
bit later than the previous one. The teacher points rhythmically to the terms one
after the other and says:
1. Teacher: Now it’s Term 8! (The teacher comes back to Term 1. She points again
with a two-ﬁnger indexical gesture to the bottom row of Term 1) Term1, has
how many [squares] on the bottom?
2. Students: 1.
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3. Teacher: (Pointing with a two-ﬁnger indexical gesture to the bottom row of
Term 2) Term 2?
4. Students: 2!
5. Teacher: (Pointing with a two-ﬁnger indexical gesture
6. to the bottom row of Term 3) Term 3?
7. Students: 3!
8. Teacher: (Pointing with a two-ﬁnger indexical gesture to the hypothetical place
where the bottom row of Term 4 would be) Term 4?
9. Students: 4!
10. Teacher: (Pointing as above) Term 5 (see Fig. 2.2)?
11. Students: 5!
12. Teacher: (Pointing as above) Term 6?
13. Students: 6!
14. Teacher: (Pointing as above) Term 7?
15. Students: 7!
16. Teacher: (Pointing as above) Term 8?
17. Students: 8!
18. Sandra: There would be 8 on the bottom!
This segment of the students-and-teacher joint labor is the semiotic node. The
excerpt allows us to see the complex coordination of sensorial modalities and
semiotic registers that collaborate in the students’ awareness or consciousness of a
functional relationship between the number of the terms and the number of squares
on the top row of the terms (Fig. 2.4).
We can turn now to the second semiotic dimension in the theory of objectiﬁ-
cation. We mentioned that this dimension has to do with a supra-structural level of
cultural meanings that shape and organize joint labor. Joint labor, indeed, is not
something that unfolds spontaneously. Although it is unpredictable and cannot be
Fig. 2.4 The teacher pointing
the bottom row of Term 5
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anticipated in all its details, it is shaped culturally. In the previous example, the
teacher did not know how the students would engage by themselves in the gen-
eralizing tasks, nor did she know how the students would react to her invitation to
explore the sequence in terms of rows. Unpredictable as it may be, joint labor is
nonetheless shaped by forms of human collaboration and modes of knowledge
production that ﬁnd their meaning in culture and society and that are fostered by the
school. These meanings have to do with conceptions about the mathematics to be
taught and learned, how it should be taught and learned, and ultimately with our
understanding of ourselves as humans. The mathematics to be taught and learned
conveys views about the purpose and the nature of mathematic (e.g., the nature of
mathematical truth, the relationship between mathematics and the empirical world),
the legitimacy of the methods of investigation, etc. Our understanding of ourselves
as humans conveys views about the child, and speciﬁcally the student, and also
about the teacher. What are their roles? The teaching and learning of mathematics
differ as we move from one historical period to another. For instance, teaching and
learning of mathematics were very different in the Mesopotamian House of Scribes,
in Plato’s time, in the Renaissance schools of Abacus and today.
What is different is not only the content, but also the conception of mathematics,
the conception of the teacher and the idea of the student. The teacher appears as a
ﬁnancial advisor (Radford 2014c). She cannot produce for the student, but can help
the student to produce more. Those meanings of mathematical truths, mathematical
methods of investigation and production, as well as the meanings of students and
teachers, ﬁnd their legitimacy in cultural meanings that go in general undisputed,
although an increasing effort is been made to expose and discuss them (see, e.g.,
Alrø et al. 2010; Pais 2013; Popkewitz 2004; Skovsmose 2008). In Radford (2006b,
2008b) these meanings are considered to be part of a symbolic suprastructure that is
called Semiotic Systems of Cultural Signiﬁcations. Radford and Empey (2007)
resort to these systems in order to investigate the historical creation of new cultural
forms of mathematical understanding and novel forms of subjectivity. They present
two case studies. One devoted to the Western Late Middle Ages and Renaissance
and the other to the Buwayhid period of medieval Islam.
2.3 The Signiﬁcance of Various Types of Signs
in Mathematics Education
2.3.1 Embodiment, Gestures, and the Body in Mathematics
Education
Embodiment has gained a great deal of attention in the past few years. Some of the
theories of embodiment in mathematics education have been influenced by Piaget’s
genetic epistemology and the Kantian idea of the schema. This is the case of the
so-called “process-object” theories; that is, theories that conceive of thinking as
22 2 Semiotics in Theory and Practice in Mathematics Education
moving from the learner’s actions to operation knowledge structures. Two exam-
ples are APOS theory (Dubinsky 2002; Dubinsky and McDonald 2001) and the
“three worlds of mathematics” (Tall 2013). The ﬁrst world of mathematics refers to
conceptual embodiment, which builds on perception and action to develop mental
images that “become perfect mental entities” (Tall 2013, p. 16). For instance, “the
number line develops in the embodied world from a physical line drawn with pencil
and ruler to a ‘perfect’ platonic construction that has length but no thickness (Tall
2008, p. 14). The meaning of the term embodiment in the “three worlds of math-
ematics” approach is explained as something that is “consistent with the colloquial
notion of ‘giving a body’ to an abstract idea” (Tall 2004, p. 32). As a result,
embodiment remains a general category; the fate of embodied actions is to be
superseded by flexible actions with symbols (Radford et al. in press).
Embodiment theories coming from the ﬁeld of cognitive linguistics generally
assume a mediator, such as (bodily) schemas, that relate the mind to the material
world (e.g., Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). The schemas themselves are the result of
bodily engagements with the world that are developed into new concepts by means
of metaphorization (Lakoff and Núñez 2000). Thus, for example, one study ana-
lyzes the hand/arm gestures that a mathematics professor produces in the course of
a lecture on the mathematical concept of continuity (Núñez 2009). In this case, the
source-path-goal schema mediates between the mathematician’s concept of conti-
nuity and the bodily gestural expression. The problem of these embodiment theories
is that something else is assumed as prior to the movement, something that then is
enacted by the body; and this assumption conjures again the specter of Cartesianism
(Sheets-Johnstone 2009). Following up on this critique, and grounded in the works
of a largely forgotten French philosopher P. Maine de Biran (e.g., 1841) and the
uptake of his work in material phenomenology (Henry 2000), an approach to
semiotics has been proposed in which bodily movement takes precedence over the
schemas or concepts ordinarily taken as that which comes to be enacted in gestures
and other signifying body movements and positions (Roth 2012). Using examples
from university physics lectures, the study shows how the signs (parts of a graph)
are the endpoint and the distillate of movements that generate a ﬁeld and perceptual
structures. The study proposes a model where body movements self-affect so as to
lead to a bifurcation in which the sign is born as the relation between two
movements.
Before the sign—understood as the relation between two segmentation ofmatter—
can be read (transparently) or interpreted, it actually has to come into being (Roth
2008). From a phenomenological perspective, “what is taken to be sign initially has
had to be accessible in it and has to be captured prior to being made sign” (Heidegger
1977, p. 81). In one study of graphing in a ﬁsh hatchery, a ﬁsh culturist with high
school certiﬁcation was looking at two distributions, one representing the weight of
100 ﬁsh, the other one the lengths of the same ﬁsh; she then showed on the graphs
which of the ﬁshes were short and fat versus those that were long and skinny (Roth
2016b). Moreover, she related the graphs to a condition coefﬁcient, which is calcu-
lated by dividing ﬁsh weight by the cube of the length and multiplying the result by
100,000. The study showed that over the years of literally handling and inspecting
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ﬁshes, and entering their lengths and weights into a spreadsheet that immediately
plotted graphs, the ﬁsh culturist had developed a feel for both graphs and the ﬁshes.
Longitudinal studies among high school students provided insights about the
emergence of signs from work generally and hands-on activities speciﬁcally (Roth
2003b; Roth and Lawless 2002). These studies show a progression from hand/arm
movements that either did work (i.e., ergotic gestures) or found something out by
means of sense (i.e., epistemic gestures) sometime later, had symbolic function.
A subsequent study of the emergence and evolution of sign systems (Roth 2015)
suggested that signs initially are immanent to the work activity; and in the transition
to symbolic function, they transcend the activity. Once there are symbolic func-
tions, these may be replaced by other signs. In the process, motivated signs (i.e.,
signs involving iconic relations) develop into arbitrary relations.
2.3.2 Linguistic Theories and Their Relevance
in Mathematics Education
An important contribution to a theory of signs can be found in the Philosophical
Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953/1997). In this pragmatic approach to the sign, the
focus is on use rather than meaning. In fact, Wittgenstein notes that the “philo-
sophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language
functions” (p. 3 [§2]). He illustrates this in articulating how to take the verb “to
signify.” He suggests marking a tool used in building something with a sign; when
the master builder shows the helper another instance of the same sign, the latter will
get the tool and bring it to the master. Throughout his book, Wittgenstein uses many
cases to exemplify that the use and function of signs matters rather than some
metaphysical concept or idea. An application of this in mathematics education
shows that signs denoting “concepts” can be taken concretely, referring us to the
many concrete ways in which some sign ﬁnds appropriate use (Roth in press).
A sign, then, is grounded in and indexes all those concrete situations in which it has
found some appropriate use. The sign “cylinder,” used by a child, then is a
placeholder for all the situations in which s/he has encountered and made use of it
(e.g., in asking questions, making constative statements, or contesting observation
categoricals of others). Here, it is apparent that the usage of signs is tied to concrete
situations. This is why Wittgenstein deﬁnes a language-game as a whole that
weaves together a concrete human activity and the language that is part of the work
of accomplishing the work. This program is taken up in ethnomethodological
research on mathematics, which studies the actual living work of doing mathe-
matics and how signs (e.g., those required to prove Gödel’s theorem) are mobilized
to do work and to formulate the work of doing (Livingston 1986). This
non-metaphysical approach to signs is taken up, for example, in studies of ethno-
mathematics (e.g., Knijnik 2012; Vilela 2010).
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Another important language theory was developed in the circle surrounding the
literary critic and philosopher M.M. Bakhtin (e.g., 1981). This theory, often referred
to as dialogism, has fundamental commonalities with the approach to language
taken by the last works of Vygotsky (e.g., Mikhailov 2001; Radford 2000; Roth
2013), even though some authors appear to be unaware of the fundamentally dia-
logic approach in Vygotsky (e.g., Barwell 2015). In both theories, there is a pri-
macy of the dialogue as the place where linguistic competence emerges; dialogue
with others is the origin of individual speaking and thinking (Vygotsky 1987). But
dialogue always presupposes familiarity with the situation and the purpose of
speaking. Moreover, dialogue requires the sign (word) to be a reality for all par-
ticipants (Vygotsky 1987; Vološinov 1930). The sign, as the commodity in a
dialectical materialist approach to political economy, is not a unitary thing (Roth
2006, 2014). Instead, the sign is conceived as a phenomenon harboring an inner
contradiction that manifests itself in the different ways that individuals may use a
sign (word). The most important aspect of the dialogical approach is that it
inherently is a dynamical conception of language and sign systems generally and of
ideas speciﬁcally. Thus, in use, signs (language) live; but because they live, signs
(language) change at the very moment of their use (Bakhtin 1981; Vološinov 1930).
That is, whenever we use signs, whether in dialogue with others or in dialogue with
ourselves, signs and the ideas developed with them evolve (Bakhtin 1984). Thus, in
this theory dialogue does not require two or more persons, and monologue may
occur even in the exchange between two persons. For Bakhtin, dialogical speech
requires the relation between two voices that build on and transform one another;
and therefore such speech is never ﬁnal. This dialogue may occur within one
person, as exempliﬁed in Dostoevsky’s novella Notes from the underground; On
the other hand, the talk involving two individuals may simply be a way of
expounding a pre-existing, ﬁnalized truth, as exempliﬁed in the works of the late
Plato, where the “monologism of the content begins to destroy the form of the
Socratic dialogue” (Bakhtin 1984, p. 110). The Bakhtinian approach is found
particularly suited in studies of mathematical learning that focus on mathematical
learning (e.g., Barwell 2015; Kazak et al. 2015) and in studies of the narrative
construction of self and the subject of mathematical activity (e.g., Braathe and
Solomon 2015; Solomon 2012).
Another line of inquiry comes from Halliday’s social semiotics (Morgan 2006,
2009, 2012). Researching from this perspective Morgan (2006) notes:
An important contribution of social semiotics is its recognition of the range of functions
performed by use of language and other semiotic resources. Every instance of mathematical
communication is thus conceived to involve not only signiﬁcation of mathematical con-
cepts and relationships but also interpersonal meanings, attitudes and beliefs. This allows us
to address a wide range of issues of interest to mathematics education and helps us to avoid
dealing with cognition in isolation from other aspects of human activity. (p. 220)
Indeed, in this line of inquiry, there is an intention to go beyond the traditional
view that reduces individuals to the cognitive realm and that reduces the student to a
cognitive subject. “Individuals do not speak or write simply to externalise their
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personal understandings but to achieve effects in their social world” (Morgan 2006,
p. 221). As a result, “Studying language and its use must thus take into account both
the immediate situation in which meanings are being exchanged (the context of
situation) and the broader culture within which the participants are embedded (the
context of culture)” (Morgan 2006, p, 221). The context of culture theoretical
construct is oriented, like the Semiotic Systems of Cultural Signiﬁcations in the
theory of objectiﬁcation alluded to before, towards the understanding of classroom
practices as loci of production of subjectivities within the parameters of culture and
society: “The context of culture includes broader goals, values, history and orga-
nizing concepts that the participants hold in common. This formulation of context
of culture suggests a uniformity of culture both between and within the partici-
pants” (Morgan 2006, p. 221). Yet, as Morgan (2006) argues, such a uniformity is
relative and needs to be nuanced in order to account for the variety of responses,
behaviors, meaning-making, and language use that are found in individuals of a
same culture:
[T]he notion of participation in multiple discourses will be used as an alternative way of
conceptualising this level of context. Importantly, however, the thinking and meaning
making of individuals is not simply set within a social context but actually arises through
social involvement in exchanging meanings. (p. 221)
2.4 Other Dimensions of Semiotics in Mathematics
Education
In this section we discuss briefly three interesting questions that have been the
object of scrutiny in semiotics and mathematics education research. The ﬁrst one is
the relationship among sign systems (e.g., natural language, diagrams, pictorial and
alphanumeric systems) and the translation between sign systems in mathematics
thinking and learning. The second one concerns semiotics and intersubjectivity.
The third one is about semiotics as the focus of innovative learning and teaching
materials.
2.4.1 The Relationship Among Sign Systems
and Translation
Duval’s (2000, 2006) studies have been very important in showing the complexities
behind the relationship between sign systems and the difﬁculties that the students
encounter when faced with moving between semiotic registers. In this line of
thought, an investigation into the meaning that students ascribe to their ﬁrst alge-
braic formulas expressed through the standard algebraic symbolism suggested that
their emerging meanings are deeply rooted in signiﬁcations that come from natural
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language and perception. In the case of the translation of statements in natural
language into the standard algebraic symbolism, Radford (2002b) noticed that the
ﬁrst algebraic statements are not only imbued with the meanings of colloquial
language, but also colloquial language lends a speciﬁc mode of designation of
objects that conflicts with the mode of designation of objects of algebraic sym-
bolism. He discusses a mathematical activity that was based on the following short
story: “Kelly has 2 more candies than Manuel. Josée has 5 more candies than
Manuel. All together they have 37 candies.” During the mathematical activity, in
Problem 1, the students were invited to designate Manuel’s number of candies by x,
to elaborate a symbolic expression for Kelly and Josée, and, then, to write and solve
an equation corresponding to the short story. In Problem 2, the students were
invited to designate Kelly’s number of candies by x while in Problem 3 the students
were invited to designate Josée’s number of candies by x. Radford suggests that one
of the difﬁculties in dealing with problems involving comparative phrases like
“Kelly has 2 more candies than Manuel” is being able to derive non-comparative,
assertive phrases of the type: “A (or B) has C”. If, say, Manuel has 4 candies, the
assertive phrase would take the form «Kelly (Subject) has (Verb) 6 (Adjective)
candies (Noun)». In the case of algebra, the adjective is not known (one does not
know how many candies A has). As a result, the adjective has to be referred to in
some way. In using a letter like ‘x’ (or another device) a new semiotic space is
opened. In this space, the story problem has to be re-told, leading to what has been
usually termed (although in a rather simplistic way) the ‘translation’ of the problem
into an equation. Radford suggests the term symbolic narrative, arguing that what is
‘translated’ still tells us a story but in mathematical symbols. (Radford 2002b). He
shows that some of the difﬁculties that the students have in operating with the
symbols are precisely related to the requirement of producing a collapse in the
original stated story. This he terms the collapse of narratives, adding
The collection of similar terms means a rupture with their original meaning. All the efforts
that were made at the level of the designation of objects to build the symbolic narrative
have to be put into brackets. The whole symbolic narrative now has to collapse. There is no
corresponding segment in the story-problem that could be correlated with the result of the
collection [addition] of similar terms. (Radford 2002b, Vol. 4, p. 87)
The longitudinal investigation of several cohorts of students in pattern gener-
alization point to a similar result: One of the crucial developmental steps in the
students’ algebraic thinking consists in moving from an indexical mode of desig-
nation to a symbolic one (see, e.g., Radford 2010b).
In a study of biological research from data collection to the published results,
Latour (1993) shows how soil samples are translated into a sign system that is
translated into other another sign system until, at the end, verbal statements about
the biological system are made. In each case, the sign system consists of a material
base with some structure. The relation between two sign systems is not inherent or
natural but is established through work. Incidentally, a similar articulation was
offered to understand how students relate a winch to pull up weights and mathe-
matical (symbolic) structures, which have symbolic notations as their material
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(Greeno 1988). To assist students in learning the relation between mathematical
graphs and the physical phenomena they are investigating, some textbooks layer
different sign systems with the apparent intention of offering students a way to link
particular aspects of one system to a corresponding aspect in the other (Roth et al.
2005). Using an example from a Korean science textbook, a graph exhibiting
Boyle’s law relating the volume V and pressure of an ideal gas (V * 1/p) is
overlaid by (a) the images of a glass beaker with different weights and (b) differ-
ently sized arrows (i.e., weight vectors) corresponding to the weights. The authors
suggest that these complexes of sign systems may be difﬁcult to unpack because
relationships emerge only when students structure each layer in a particular way so
that the desired relationships then can be constructed.
2.4.2 Semiotics and Intersubjectivity
A different take on intersubjectivity apparently arose from Vygotsky’s “last,
‘Spinozan’ works [where] the idea of semiotic mediation is supplanted by the
concept of the intersubjective speech ﬁeld” (Mikhailov 2006, p. 35). Because
children always already ﬁnd themselves in an intersubjective speech ﬁeld, the world
and language are given to them as their own. As a result, there exists a “dynamic
identity of intersubjectivity and intrasubjectivity” (p. 36). Subjectivity is a signiﬁ-
cant topic in its own right (e.g., Brown 2011), which can only be mentioned here.
2.4.3 Semiotics as the Focus of Innovative Learning
and Teaching Materials
Digital mathematics textbooks, instructional materials integrating interactive dia-
grams, interactive visual examples and visual demonstration animations have
constituted a privileged terrain of research in mathematics education. Semiotics
helps to understand the challenges driven by these materials. Some important
threads are as follows:
• Innovative visualization tools for teaching and learning;
• Design of activities and tasks that are based on interactive visual examples;
• Patterns of reading, using and solving with interactive linked multiple
representations;
• Roles of diagrams, animations and video as instructional tools with new
technologies.
One recent study exhibits the different types of work students need to accom-
plish to relate natural phenomena and different computer-based, dynamic sign
systems—images and graphs—that are used to stand in for the former (Jornet and
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Roth 2015). In each case, that is, in natural phenomenon and sign systems, struc-
turing work is required to get from the material base to a structure. The structures of
the different systems may then be related and compared, often leading to a revision
in the structuring process, which enables new forms or relations between the dif-
ferent systems
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